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Abstract
Criminals can launder crypto-currencies through mixing coins, whose original
purpose is preservation of privacy in the presence of traceability. Therefore, it’s
essential to elaborately design mixing polices to achieve both privacy and anti-
money laundering. Existing work on mixing policies relies on the knowledge of
a blacklist. However, these policies are paralyzed under the scenario where the
blacklist is unknown or evolving. In this paper, we regard the above scenario
as games under incomplete information where parties put down a deposit for
the quality of coins, which is suitably managed by a smart contract in case
of mixing bad coins. We extend the poison and haircut policies to incomplete
information games, where the blacklist is updated after mixing. We prove the
existence of equilibria for the improved polices, while it is known that there
is no equilibria in the original poison and haircut policies, where blacklist is
public known. Furthermore, we propose a seminal suicide policy: the one who
mixes more bad coins will be punished by not having the deposit refunded.
Thus, parties have no incentives to launder money by leveraging mixing coins.
In effect, all three policies contrast money laundering while preserving privacy
under incomplete information. Finally, we simulate and verify the validity of
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1. Introduction
The whole transactions’ history in blockchain is transparent by resorting
to some probing tools. For instance, it’s easy to trace the source of bitcoins
even if the accounts are anonymous. Some empirical experiments indicate that
anonymous parties of bitcoins in the cyberspace can be traced to their true5
identities in real world. As a consequence, parties’ privacy is sabotaged without
protection for identities and transactions. The seminal idea of mixing coins
consists of collecting coins from several sources and distributing coins to various
targets. The basic principle is to strip the addressed of source and targets such
that no traceability can be implemented by probing tools. Thus the privacy and10
anonymity are strengthened.
The most popular mixer is based on coin mixing protocols without host. e.g
Coinjoin and Coinshuffle [1, 2, 3]. Parties can mix their coins through certain
service providers, such as Wasabi wallet and Samourai wallet. However it leaves
mixing coins vulnerable to adversarial behaviours, such as money laundry. For15
example, in December 2019, one account has been suspended by Binance Singa-
pore since it attempted to send bitcoins to Wasabi wallet. Binance announced
that the account violated Binance Singapore’s anti-money laundering policy and
triggered a risk alert from the monetary authority of Singapore. In February
2020, US authorities charged DropBit CEO for allegedly laundering bitcoins for20
311M USD. The indictment asserts that the Helix mixer is suspected of being
involved in remittances and money laundering.1
Therefore, new mechanism of mixing coins are clearly needed to improve the




by utilizing deposits managed by smart contracts according to game theory25
principles [4, 5]. Note that we may also utilize some advanced technology like
machine learning [6], data mining [7] and secure multi-party computation [8, 9]
to solve these kind of problems since adversaries need to learn the quality of
bad coins. Here the quality of bad coins means the ratio of the bad coins.
In this paper our results are established on the assumption of a blacklist30
with adversarial learning, and therefore we will focus on adversarial behaviours
through the view of game theory under incomplete information [10, 11], which is
a more complex scenario for machine learning system. We assume the existence
of a blacklist dynamically updated as a service managed by a trusted third
party. The initial listing of a coin in the blacklist is clearly critical and requires35
trust in the blacklist manager. Information about transactions, on which the
blacklist is based, is actually public and verifiable and does not require trust.
Other judgements may also be easily verifiable, consider for instance coins from
a publicly known ransomware address. However, blacklist management may
clearly constitute a dominant position. The problem of trust in blacklists is40
scope for future work.
1.1. Related work
There have been a flurry of related works in mixing coins, while this work
sets out to address the problem of privacy preserving and anti-money launder.
Many empirical works focus on other problems such as phishing protection [12]45
and data sharing [13]. However, these works are not fully convincing, not being
suitably supported by formal analysis. Edward et al. explore the model for mal-
ware infections in blacklisting by utilizing a simple Markov model [14]. Hofmeyr
et al. trade off between prevented harm and collateral damage by modelling po-
tential policy interventions [15]. In fact, it’s better to describe these problems50
in game theory with economic views. For example, Acquisti et al. [16] discuss
the economic incentives in message anonymization from the viewpoint of game
theory, even if blockchains had not been defined at the time.
Moser et al. propose three policies to assess risk in bitcoin transactions,
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focusing on risk scoring and the implications of blacklisting: poison, haircut55
and seniority for quality propagation [17]. Bonneau et al. [18] borrow the above
three policies and analyse them toward game-theoretic view. More specifically,
they formalize the game of mixing coins with different quality. They analyse
the conditions to reach equilibria for different scenarios including perfect games
and imperfect simultaneous-move games. However, their work does not consider60
extensive games under incomplete information, which is more suitable for real
application scenarios2.
1.2. Motivations and contributions
The original incentive for mixing coins is to provide privacy for sponsors
(aka. privacy seeker), who pay privacy providers for the service. However,65
perpetrators may launder money by mixing with bad coins, which jeopardize
the original incentives for mixing coins. Indeed, it is a better practice to only
mix coins with good coins. That is, parties with bad coins should bear no
incentives to mixing coin services.
The intuition of the approach followed in this paper is that privacy seekers70
and mixing providers commit deposits through smart contracts before they mix
coins. The ones who attempt to mix bad coins will be punished by deducting
their deposits. Thus, perpetrators have no incentives to mix bad coins especially
when the deposits are larger than bad coins. Such a trivial solution can be
trivially achieved by implementing deposit mechanisms in the poison and haircut75
policy of [22]. Unfortunately, these policies are not geared to the following
scenario: the blacklist is updated during the process of mixing coins and the
parties therein are allowed to alternatively take actions. Although the work
of [22] discusses the scenario under imperfect information, they only analyze
simultaneous games, where parties take actions at the same time.80
In this paper, we consider a more complex scenario, i.e. extensive games
2Note that fuzzy theory can be also used to solve a number of relevant problems. However,
this is out of scope here. Interested readers may refer to [19, 20, 21] for more details.
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under incomplete information. In Figure 1, the blacklist is updated within an
interval T and the time for mixing coins is S > T . Initially, the blacklist L is
partial knowledge to Bob since bad coins x are not updated to the blacklist.
Bob deems x as good coins and mixes his coins y with Alice’s coins x. The85
dotted boxes in mixing transaction trold denote the outputs in the context that
x are good coins. However, the blacklist is updated to L′ after interval T ,
and x are detected as bad coins in L′. Therefore, the receivers get outputs
in trnew instead of trold. The gray boxes denote the outputs with bad coins
3.
Consequently, Alice successfully mixes bad coins under such scenario. In the90
following of this paper, incomplete information refer to scenarios similar to the
one in Figure 1, if not differently specified.















Updated in interval T





Figure 1: The mixing coins under incomplete information.
We revisit poison and haircut policies and extend them to incomplete infor-
mation; we discuss the limits of seniority policy in the presence of incomplete
information; and we overcome such limitations by proposing the new suicide95
3Note that we do not demonstrate the concrete policy here. Therefore, the gray boxes just
symbols for the outputs with bad coins and are not generated by any specific policy.
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policy, which enforces the punishment to those that mix bad coins. The main
contributions of this paper are as follows:
• Poison and haircut policy are revisited for mixing coins and extended to
incomplete information. A deposit mechanism based on a smart contract
is introduced to facilitate privacy protecting while avoiding money laun-100
dering trough mixing coins.
• We show that seniority policy is invalid under incomplete information,
where a blacklist is not timely updated. This is due, intuitively speaking,
to the fact that the policy fails to negotiate the order and amounts of
transaction’s outputs since the blacklist does not necessarily include all105
bad coins at the beginning of mixing.
• We propose suicide policy, as an improved seniority policy, to punish
the parties with a low-level of good coins. That is, all bad coins are
assigned to the parties who are mixing with the larger numbers of bad
coins. Furthermore, deposits are not refund to the one who mix with the110
larger numbers of bad coins.
• We prove the existence of equilibria for the poison, haircut and suicide
policy, respectively. We carry out simulations, whose results show the
validity of these new policies under incomplete information. Furthermore,
privacy seekers and providers may choose optimal mix strategies to reach115
a trade-off between privacy and anti-money laundering.
1.3. Road map
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some
preliminaries, e.g. different types of games and mixing coins. An extensive game
under incomplete information is described in Section 3, where we bridge the120
notions between game theory and our model, and redefine utilities for our model.
We analyze the equilibria conditions for each policy in Section 4. Moreover, we
propose a new policy to solve the problem in seniority, where two parties cannot
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negotiate under incomplete information. In section 5, simulations are shown to
empirically and visually support out theoretical analysis. Section 6 summarizes125
results and looks into future work.
2. Background on games and mixing policies
2.1. Games under incomplete information
In game theory, parties are assumed to be rational and aim to to maxi-
mize their utilities. Games fall into various categories according to different130
rules. Static and extensive games are defined according to whether parities take
actions simultaneously; perfect and imperfect games are defined according to
whether parties achieve complete action information with respect to their op-
ponents; complete and incomplete games are defined whether parties may or
may not learn all information about the game. These games can arbitrarily135
be combined in new categories, like static games under perfect information,
incomplete games under incomplete information, etc. In this paper, we focus
on extensive games under incomplete information, where parties take actions
alternatively and they observe the actions of forgoers. Incomplete information
here means that parties have partial information on strategy space, utilities140
etc. More specifically, parties only have partial information about the blacklist
when they make decisions: due to the lack of timely updates, the blacklist be-
comes partial information for parties. However, for simplicity, we assume that
the blacklist will be updated during the game, and it is common knowledge for
both parties. We rely on smart contracts that may decide whether to refund145
deposits or not according to the blacklist.
For completeness, we repeat the definition of extensive game under incom-
plete information as in [23].
Definition 1. An extensive game with incomplete information
< P, Ai∈{1,2..}, H, P, fc, (IPi)i∈{1,2..}, Ui∈{1,2..} >
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is described as follows.150
1. A set of parties P = {Pi}, i ∈ {1, 2, ...}.
2. A set of actions Ai for each Pi. The action profile is denoted as a =
(a1, a2, ..., ...), where ai ∈ Ai.
3. A set of histories H consisting of sequences actions of assigned parties.
The set of actions available after the nonterminal histories is denoted by155
Z.
4. A function P that assigns to each nonterminal history a party Pj ∈ P.
5. For each party Pj , an information set is denoted by IPj sufficing that
h ∈ H : P (h) = Pj .
6. For each party Pj , a utility function Uj defined on Z denotes his payoffs.160
Another important notion in game theory, is equilibria, which guarantee parties
not to deviate from specific strategy. The main task of sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium in extensive and incomplete information is to delete unbelievable
threat strategies from Nash equilibria such that reasonable results are predicted.
More specifically, sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium requires that the behaviors165
in equilibrium are optimal in each information set.
Definition 2. A strategy profile is a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium if
this profile is Nash equilibrium for each sub-game.
One way to solve equilibria in extensive games under incomplete informa-
tion is backward induction. Backward induction is an iterative process, which is170
commonly used in finite extensive form and sequential games. More specifically,
the player who makes the last move in the game choose his/her optimal strategy.
Then, given these optimal strategy, it’s turn for the next-to-last moving player
to choose his/her optimal strategy. This process continues backward until each
player involved in this game choose their optimal strategies. In effect, the op-175
timal strategy for each player constitutes the strategy profile (aka. sub-game
perfect Nash equilibrium).
Theorem 1. A strategy profile is sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of
extensive game with incomplete information, if and only if it’s selected by back-
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ward induction.180
2.2. Policies in mixing coins
Mixing coins is proposed to strengthen anonymity (avoiding privacy leakage),
since the transactions and their origins are public and can be easily traced
with blockchain exploration tools. The mixing process is as follows [3], taking
Coinjoin as an example.185
1. Assume a group of parties U = u1, u2, ...un who are willing to mix their
coins. They resort to service providers, e.g. some wallets, which provide
mixing service. Coinjoin is one of these services, is practical and imple-
mented in some wallet [24, 25].
2. Policies about mixing with bad coins are in place and publicly known by190
the parties. That is, the parties should know the consequence if they mix
with bad coins. Thus, they decide whether to mix according to the quality
of their coin. Generally, parties with bad coins are willing to mix so that
they can laundry their coins. On the other hand, parties with good coins
risk to lose their money if they mix with bad coins. Therefore, the mixing195
policies are rather important in the mixing process.
3. With the help of the wallet, all ui generate a mixing transaction that
includes the addresses of each ui as inputs and the mixing addresses of
the mixing service as outputs.
4. The mixing service needs to be trusted by parties in U , which need to200
sign with their keys the transaction. of the members in U . Otherwise, the
transaction is invalid.
5. Parties verify whether the jointly signed transaction sends correct coins
to the output addresses. If not, they refuse to mix coins and quit.
After mixing, it is hard to trace coins by simply relying on transactions’ input-205
output relations, since parties in mixing coins merge their inputs and outputs
into a single transaction. Parties who seek anonymity need to find available
peers to mix with in the blockchain system. Therefore, they are generally ready
to pay a mixing fee to incentive others to take part in mixing with them.
9
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Issues spring up because perpetrators may be willing to mix their low-quality210
(bad) coins, both earning the mixing fee and laundry their money. The solution
to blacklist unsafe coins is effective, since parties will decline to mix their coins
with those in the blacklist in order to avoid that bad coins diffuse through
mixing. [22] presents three policies for quality propagation: poison, haircut and
seniority policy. In the sequel, we briefly summarise their basic idea.215
We inherit their notation: qa, qb ∈ [0, 1] denote the quality of coins of a
privacy seeker and a privacy provider, respectively, where qa = 0 denotes that
all coins of the privacy seeker are bad, and qa = 1 that all are good. We use q
′
a,
q′b to denote the updated coin quality after the mixing and a, b to denote the
number of coins of the parties, respectively.220
• Poison policy. The presence of a single bad coin ”poisons” all coins of a
party, i.e. qa = 0 if only one coin is blacklisted. Differently, qa = 1 implies
that all coins are good. For simplicity, we assume that the number of
output coins equals that of input coins. Coin quality is updated according
to Table 1. It’s easy to see that q′a = q
′
b = qaqb.225
• Haircut policy. The privacy seeker and provider are again jointly re-
sponsible for the bad coins, as they will have the same coin quality after




a+b . Obviously, parties with higher coin
quality have no incentives to mix (if not the fees), since their quality will
decrease.230
• Seniority policy. The privacy seeker and privacy provider need to know
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the exact coin quality qa and qb, in order to enter negotiation. Importantly,
the most distinctive feature of the seniority policy is that the coin quality
does not change through mixing, after negotiation. This policy however
requires that the blacklist is updated timely, otherwise parties fails to235
negotiate beforehand. A detailed example of negotiation can be found in
in [22].
3. Games and utility under incomplete information
3.1. Game with deposits under incomplete information
The framework of our mixing games is similar to that of [22] except for the240
information sets. There are two parties in each game: privacy seeker S with a
coins of quality qa, and privacy provider P with b coins of quality qb, where qa
and qb denote the ratio of good coins for S and P respectively. Here good coins
means coins which are not listed in blacklist. The game is as follows.
1. S decides whether to sponsor a mixing request and the coins who will245
invest in the mixing.
2. If S decides not to mix with others, S does not to sponsor a request. The
ratios of good coins remain unchanged. In general, S invests a for mixing.
However, S must budge for the bribery c once s/he decides to sponsor the
request. Put differently, S only invest a− c if s/he decides not to sponsor250
a request. Otherwise, s/he should invest a including the bribery.
3. If S sponsors a request for mixing coins with cost g. The cost g is burned
no matter P accepts it or not. Note that the invest coins are a and b for
S and P respectively. Then it’s turn for P to decide whether to accept
the request.255
(a) If P does not accept to mix, two parties fail to mix. The ratios of
good coins remain unchanged.
(b) If P accepts to mix, P gets a bribery c.
(c) Finally, S and P update ratios of good coins q′a, q′b.
4. So far, the game is identical to [22].260
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The most distinctive feature is that the blacklist may be updated periodi-
cally, i.e. the blacklist is updated during party interaction. In this case, parties
with bad coins may take advantage from mixing with others. For example, S
requests to mix a good coins, currently not in the blacklist, with P. P checks
the blacklist learning that the a coins are not in blacklist and accepts the re-265
quest. However, before they de-facto mix their coins, the blacklist is updated
including the a coins as bad coins. Consequently, P suffers from mixing bad
coins without any remedial measure. In some sense, the blacklist provides only
partial information to P in this example.
Ideally, P should be able to cope with the limits of such partial informa-270
tion from the blacklist. We introduce a deposit enforced by smart contracts
in the policies described above, seen as a game. The basic idea is simple: S
deposits d1 before sponsoring the request and P deposits d2 before accepting
the request. For simplicity, we assume that d = d1 = d2. Deposits will be re-
funded to each party if there are no bad coins after their interaction. Note that275
it’s assumed that blacklist updates before refunding happens, so that partial
information becomes common knowledge. Furthermore, in our game S and P
move alternatively under incomplete information, which differs from the simul-
taneous move in [22]. Due to partial and evolving information, the information
set for S and P may differ. In the sequel, parties achieve expected utilities U280
with respect to their information set. The extensive game under incomplete
information with deposits, dubbed as Gd, is shown in Figure 2, and defined as
< P, Ai∈{S,P}, H, P, fc, (IPi)i∈{S,P}, Ui∈{S,P} > according to Definition 1:
1. A set of parties P = {S,P}, denoting privacy seeker and privacy provider
respectively.285
2. Action set AS = {Sponsor,Not Sponsor}, where the former denotes that
S sponsor a mixing smart contract and the latter denotes the opposite
side. Action set AP = {Accept,Not Accept}, where the former denotes
that P accept mixing and the latter denotes the opposite side.
3. The set of history H denotes the action sequence from the root to the ter-290
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minal nodes in Figure 2. For example, (Sponsor, Accept) and (Sponsor,
Not Accept) are histories in Gd. The terminal nodes with respect to ter-
minal histories Z are graphical represented as squares in Figure 2. Non-
terminal nodes are presented as hollowed and solid circles. The hollowed
circles mean that decision maker is either S or P. The solid circle means295
that blacklist leads to partial information with uncertain probabilities p
and 1− p, the meaning of which varies with policies [26]. We will present
details in following sections.
4. The function P assigns to each nonterminal history a party so that they
take their actions alternatively. For example, P assigns P to nonterminal300
histories Sponsor and Not Sponsor.
5. The dotted line labeled with S (P) in Figure 2 denotes the information
set IS (IP).
6. The terminal histories of Gd are labelled with the pair of utilities of S and
P, respectively. These are discussed in the next section.305
S
SponsorNot Sponsor Not SponsorSponsor
P






2 3 4 5
6
Figure 2: The extensive game under incomplete information with deposits.
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3.2. Utilities for the new game
The definition of utilities for each terminal nodes are similar to [22] except
for the deposits and laundry incomes. The utility function consists of five com-
ponents:
1. Privacy incomes up: It indicates the privacy achievement for each party310
with coefficients τa ∈ [0, 1] and τb ∈ [0, 1] for S and P respectively, which






2. Laundry incomes ul: It indicates the degree that parties value the laun-
dering, i.e. mixing, money. The coefficients are λa ∈ [0, 1] and λb ∈ [0, 1]315
for S and P respectively. For example, S does not value the laundering
money if λa = 0. Therefore, λa only affects the coins after mixing. The





3. Coins for mixing: S and P invest a coins and b coins, respectively, to mix
with each other. So, the utilities of this part are aq′a and bq
′
b. It is worth320
remarking that this case includes the mixing costs c (see next item) paid
as an incentive to invite P to mix. However, P has the right to accept it
or not. If P refuses, then S only invests a− c coins to mix. In this case,
according to the chosen notation, the utilities for S and P are (a − c)qa
and bqb, respectively (as in node 1 in Figure 2).325
4. Mixing costs c: This cost is due to S trying to incentives P to accept to
mix coins together. This is done by sponsoring a smart contract in charge
of guaranteeing the promised payment to P. Therefore, the utilities of
this part are −cqa and cq′b for S and P respectively. Note cq′b instead of
cqb, due to the fact that c coins are paid to P after mixing. Actually, in330
the presence of a smart contract, we should also consider the cost g of
the gas needed for running the contract. Given that generally g is much
smaller than c, we neglected g in this paper for simplicity.
5. Deposits ud: Deposits are introduced for the purpose of preventing parties
from using bad coins in mixing: parties may lose the deposit if their coins335
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result to be in the blacklist after an update of the list. As an example, S
wants to mix coinS coins, which are not in the blacklist L at the beginning
of the process, but will be included in the revised blacklist L′ (Figure 1).
P will accept mixing since coinS are good coins. Thus, P will eventually
suffer from mixing with coins that have been meanwhile blacklisted. Under340
complete information, P would instead have never accepted the mixing.
S may leverage the updating gap to decoy P for mixing. Therefore, the
deposits are important to prevent S from a successful decoy.
After the mixing, no deposit will be refunded to any part that will result to
have used bad coins in the mixing. If only one party will result to have used345
bad coins, a fee will be deducted from its (non-returned) deposit and paid
to the counterpart, which does not have bad coins, as a compensation, i.e.
a bonus. The amount of the bonus is proportional to the amount of bad
coins used in the mixing by the (only) offender. If both parties will result
to have used bad coins, the fee will be deducted to both - proportionally350
- and paid as a bonus to the counterpart, respectively.
For instance, suppose that in the end, according to the revised blacklist
L′, we have q′a = 0.333, i.e. only 1/3 of S’s coins are good, while all P’s
coins are good. Then 2/3 of S’s deposit, 6 out of 9 coins say, will be paid
to P as a bonus.355
It is worth remarking that i. deposits and bonus are fully managed by a
smart contract according to the updated blacklist L′ (Figure 1). Parties
pay the deposit to the smart contract, since they can trust that it will be
correctly executed by the blockchain. Different formulations for refunds
and bonuses can be adopted; ii. the contract earns coins from the non-360
returned deposits. One could imagine that such a surplus could be used
for supporting parties that have incurred losses due to bad mixing. This
is scope for future work; and iii. for the sake of simplicity we assume
here that deposit coins are actually good coins (also in the revised L′).
Relaxing this assumption is also scope for future work.365
Formally, the depositing and refunding processes are as follows.
15
(a) Parties do not pay a deposit if S does not sponsor or P does not
accept the mixing (nodes 1,2,5,6 in Figure 2).
(b) If S sponsors a smart contract and P accepts it, then S and P pay the
deposit d to the smart contract before mixing. Therefore, deposits370
incur −dqa and −dqb to S and P respectively.
(c) The utility due to deposits depends on whether parties get refunds or
a bonus after mixing, according to the following three possible cases:
i. Both S and P have no bad coins after mixing. The smart con-
tract refund d to both parties. Therefore, deposits incur −dq′a375
and −dq′b to S and P respectively. So, the net utility incurred
by depositing are −dqa + dq′a and −dqb + dq′b, respectively. Note
that −(−dqa + dq′a) = dqa − dq′a and −(−dqb + dq′b) = dqb − dq′b
are withhold by the smart contract as bonus to others.
ii. Only one party, S say, has bad coins. The smart contract returns380
to P its deposit d and a bonus deducted from the d of S. It
returns the remaining coins from S’s deposit to S. The bonus
is computed according to coin qualities: P receives dq′b (due to
refund of the deposit) and dqa − dq′a (due to a positive bonus).
S does not get the deposit back. Therefore, the net utility for S385
is –dqa and for P is (−dqb + dq′b) + (dqa − dq′a).
iii. Both S and P have bad coins. In this case, the smart contract
does not refund any deposit and the bonuses are determined as
follow: the bonus for S is dqb − dq′b and for P is dqa − dq′a.
Therefore, the net utility for S is (–dqa + dq′a) + (dqb − dq′b) and390
for P is (–dqb + dq′b) + (dqa − dq′a).
In Figure 2, the utilities for S and P are listed below the leaf nodes. The utilities
for nodes 3 and 4 are more complex, and depend on the different policies. Note
that the utilities for each leaf do not necessarily consist of all the five parts
mentioned above.395
• Utilities for nodes 1 and 6. S does not sponsor a mixing request. There-
fore, S only spends a− c coins, not needing the sponsoring budget c. On
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the other hand, P retains b coins. The coins’ quality remains unchanged.
Therefore, the utilities for node 1 and 6 are defined as (a− c)qa and bqb,
respectively.400
• Utilities for nodes 2 and 5. S sponsors a mixing request while P does not
accept the request. It follows that S and P do not mix. However, S should
budget for sponsoring beforehand, even if P does not accept the request.
P retains b coins. In addition, the coins’ quality remains unchanged. So
the utilities for node 2 and 5 are defined as aqa and bqb, respectively.405
• Utilities for node 3 and 4. S sponsors a smart contract and P accepts
it, and S and P mix coins. Recall that S bribes P with c. Thus, S and
P invest a (which includes c) and b, respectively. Furthermore, coins’
qualities are updated according to the different policies. Distinguishing in
our framework, parties deposit a deposit, whose restitution is regulated
by the smart contract according to the updated blacklist L′, so coping
with partial information and uncertainty. Utilities in nodes 3 and 4 differ
according to the coins’ quality, but they can be expressed by the general









b. Let βa = τa + λa + 1,







a − cqa) + (−dqa + dq′a) + (dqb − dq′b)
= βaaq
′















b − dqb + dq′b + dqa − dq′a
(2)
4. Equilibria in mixing games under incomplete information
In this section, we will analyze the conditions for sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium with respect to each policy under incomplete information by im-
plementing backward induction. We will present, given proper conditions,
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(Sponsor,Accept) is sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium for each policy accord-410
ing to backward induction.
4.1. Poison policy
According to this policy, qa = 1 holds when none of the a coins is in the








However, P may not be sure whether qa could actually evolve to q′a = 0
after a revision of the blacklist, given partial information of P. P has a prior
probability p on whether qa = 1. Note that, in node 3, qa is assumed to be 1
with probability p. Therefore, the utilities for S and P follow from (1) and (2)




b = qaqb = qb:420
US = βaaqb − c− d+ dqb, UP = βbbqb + cqb (3)
Note that formula (3) may correspond to 5(d) case 1 or 5(d) case 2 relying
on coins’ quality of P.
In node 4, qa is assumed to be 0 with probability 1−p. Therefore, the utilities
for S and P follow from (1) and (2) with qa = 0 and q′a = q′b = qaqb = 0:
U ′S = U
′
P = 0 (4)
Note that formula (4) may correspond to 5(d) case 2 or 5(d) case 3 relying425
on coins’ quality of P.
It is worth remarking that P may accept mixing sponsored by S only when
qb = 1. Otherwise, US = −c − d < 0 < bqb and S would not propose a mixing
to P. Therefore, we have,
US = βaa− c, UP = βbbqb + cqb (5)
Consequently, we first analyse the choices of P according to backward in-430
duction. P had to make a decision once Gb reaches information set IP . Here P
may either accept or not accept to mix coins with S.
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1. If he chooses Not Accept, P gets expected utility bqb no matter what q
is. Note that P gets expected utility due to the partial information. For
example, P think S has bad coins with probability p. Therefore, the utility435
is bqb in node 2 with probability p and bqb in node 5 with probability 1−p
(ref. Figure. 2). The expected utility is pbqb + (1− p)bqb = bqb.
2. If he chooses Accept, he gets expected utility UP = pUP + (1 − p)U ′P .
Note that in node 3, the utility is UP with probability p and in node 4,
the utility U ′P with probability 1− p.440
The expected utilities are defined in similar way if not specified. P chooses




(when qb = 1) (6)
Note that P can choose any action when qb = 0 since both lead to utility 0.
Then we backward to anaylse S ′s choices.
1. If he chooses Not Sponsor, S gets utility a− c.
2. If he chooses Sponsor, he gets expected utility US = pUS + (1− p)U ′S .445




(when qb = 1) (7)
Given p > bbβb+c , p >
a−c
βa−c , (Sponsor,Accept) is sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium. That is, no one can increase his/her utility by unilaterally deviate
from the equilibrium.
4.2. Haircut policy





1. S obtains expected utility US = βaaaqa+bqba+b + (qa − qb)d if he choose
Sponsor and aqa otherwise.
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2. Gb will follow the history (Sponsor,Accept), then it should suffice that
UP > bqb and US > aqa. That is,
P obtains expected utility UP = βbbaqa+bqba+b +(qa−qb)d if he choose Accept455
and bqb otherwise.
Gb will follow the history (Sponsor,Accept), then it should suffice that UP >




abβa − (a+ b)d





(1− βb)b2 − (a+ b)d+ ab
abβb + (a+ b)d
(9)
If qaqb meets formulas (8) and (9), S has incentives to sponsor a mixing request
and P has incentives to accept it. There also exists a sub-game equilibrium460
(Sponsor,Accept) in haircut policy.
4.3. Suicide policy: a variant of seniority policy
Seniority policy is invalid in Gd because blacklist may be partial information
and S and P fail to negotiate with respect to allocation without exactly knowing
qa and qb. A trivial solution is to leverage cryptographic tools (e.g. secure465
multiparty computation) for parties to negotiate. For example, parties securely




b) with their private inputs. However,
S and P may conceal the coin quality. Furthermore, efficiency may be not
acceptable for specific applications.
In this paper, we propose a variant of seniority policy, which allows parties to470
mix coins without negotiating beforehand. The basic idea is simple: the party
who has higher ratio of bad coins will pay the bill of all bad coins. For example,
if S has more bad coins, all bad coins will be assigned to S after mixing. The
update rules of coins’ quality for suicide policy is shown in Table 2.
The utilities for each terminal history are defined similar to poison policy.
The utility definitions are shown in Formulations (10)-(13).
US = (βaa+ d+
ad
d








qa ≥ qb 1 max{0, bqb+a(qa−1)b }
qa < qb max{0, aqa+b(qb−1)a } 1
UP = (βbb+ c+ d)(qb +
a
b
(qa − 1))− qbd+ qad− d (11)
U ′S = (βaa− c+ d)(qa +
b
a
(qb − 1))− qad+ qbd− d (12)




Formulations (10)-(13) are too complex to analyse, so we present a simple475
version for suicide policy. More specifically, we assume bqb+a(qa−1)b < 0 and
aqa+b(qb−1)
b < 0 are always less than 0. That is, aqa + bqb < min{a, b}. Then
max{0, bqb+a(qa−1)b } = 0 and max{0,
aqa+b(qb−1)
b } = 0. The simplified suicide
policy is shown in Table 3. Consequently, we have the simplified utilities.
US = βaa− cqa + d− qad+ qbd > 0 (14)
UP = −qbd+ qad− d < 0 (15)
U ′S = −cqa − qad+ qbd− d < 0 (16)
U ′P = βbb+ c+ d− qbd+ qad > 0 (17)
Backward induction. P may either accept or not accept to mix coins with480
S.
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qa ≥ qb 1 0
qa < qb 0 1
1. If he chooses Not Accept, P gets expected utility bqb no matter what q is.
The utilities are bqb in nodes 2, 5 (ref. Figure 2). Therefore, the expected
utility is pbqb + (1− p)bqb = bqb.
2. If he chooses Accept, he gets expected utility UP = pUP+(1−p)U ′P . Note485
that the utility is UP in nodes 3 and U
′
P in node 4.
P chooses Accept if UP > bqb suffices. That is,
qa >
bqb + dqb + bpβb + pc+ 2pd− bβb − c− d
d
(18)
Then we backward to analyse S ′s choices.
1. If he chooses Not Sponsor, S gets utility aqa.
2. If he chooses Sponsor, he gets expected utility US = pUS + (1− p)U ′S .
S chooses Sponsor if US > aqa suffices. That is,
qa <
apβa + (2p+ qb − 1)d
a+ c+ d
(19)
Similarly to poison and haircut policies, the sub-game perfect Nash equi-490
librium (Sponsor,Accept) exists in suicide policy when formulas (18)(19) are
established. Put differently, S sponsors a mixing request and P accepts it.
Meanwhile, both parties have no incentives to mix with bad coins. Otherwise,
the one who mix more bad coins will suffer from affording all bad coins.
5. Simulations495
We simulate the conditions of aforementioned equilibria for each policy with
Matlab. In this paper, we address extensive games under incomplete informa-
tion, a more complex but practical scenario. For simplicity, we fix some pa-
rameters, only keeping crux metrics in order to find the incidence of equilibria.
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Furthermore, we restrict the range for the parameters without loss of generality500
to simulate the theoretical results. For example, a, b ∈ [1, 10], qa, qb, p ∈ [0, 1],
βa, βb ∈ [1, 3], d > a, d > b, 1 < c < a. We highlight that in [22], there is
no mixing equilibrium for these policies. While in this paper, there are, given
proper parameters, no more than one equilibrium for all three policies.
5.1. Poison policy505
Recall that in simultaneous-move game under imperfect information, the
authors claim that no one would like to mix good coins with others in case of
encountering bad coins. That is, no equilibrium exist in [22], where privacy
seeker sponsors mixing and privacy provider responds to it. However, in this
paper, we prove that there are more than one equilibrium in Gd for the case510
of poison policy. More specifically, the Formulas (6) and (7) are borderlines
for P and S respectively to reach the equilibrium. A more clear graphical
representation is shown in Figure 3. For example, c = 7.25, p = 0.35 is an
equilibrium here. In effect, the points in gray area constitute the set of equilibria.
The reason for the absence of qa and qb is that their values are either 0 or 1.515
The trend for the grey area is: c increases with the decreasing of p. That is,
S costs less if P has more confidence that S has more good coins. An extreme
case in Figure 3 occurs that P would like to accept the mixing request when
he believes, with probability only around 60%, that S has good coins even if
the payment is 0. However, the payment increases to 7.25 when the probability520
decreases to 35%. We may take another way to understand: a bad reputation
for S should pay a high cost for mixing. On the other hand, S has no incentives
to sponsor a mixing when cost is higher than 7.25.
Note that p = 0.5 is chosen since not all choices of p lead to the existence
of equilibria. Figure 4 presents the relationship between p and qa under fixed525
parameters. qa is valid only p falls between 0.44 and 0.57, which may variant
with the changes of other parameters, while the trend is similar.
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Figure 3: The conditions of equilibrium for poison policy (a = b = 10, d = 25, βa = 1.5,
βb = 2.1).


















Recall that in simultaneous-move game under imperfect information with
respect to haircut policy, the authors claim that “there will be no equilibrium530
outcome with a strictly positive payoff for both players, ...”[22]. In this paper,
Figure 5 illustrates the effect of a, qa/qb on equilibria. Unlike the case of poison
policy, there is no distinct linear relationship between a and qa/qb. The common
universality for the points in grey area in Figure 5 is that most points require
qa/qb > 1. That is, the quality of S should be at least higher than that of P.535
For instance, there exists an equilibrium when a = 9 and qa/qb = 1.22. Note
that it’s not always establish for haircut policy, where, for example, a = 2, 3, 4...
and qa/qb = 1.22. Therefore, the existence of equilibria heavily depends on
parameters.
















Figure 5: The conditions of equilibrium for haircut policy (b = 10, d = 20, βa = 1.5, βb = 0.5,
c = 0.1, p = 0.5).
5.3. Suicide policy540
In [22], the seniority policy can be reduced to haircut policy. Therefore, it
inherits the conclusions of haircut policy there. The authors also claim that
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seniority policy is more or less a modification of signal game under incomplete
information with cost commitment. Unfortunately, there are still no more mix-
ing equilibria for seniority with respect to seniority policy. In this paper, we545
revisit seniority policy and propose an updated version since parties cannot ne-
gotiate without knowing the exact values of bad coins. The deposits in suicide
policy can be regarded as cost commitment for game Gd. The existence of de-
posits deters parties not to mix bad coins. Otherwise deposits will not refund.
There are more than one equilibrium for suicide policy under the thrust of de-550
posits (grey area in Figure 6). For example, c = 2.8, qa = 0.56 constitute an
equilibrium. Generally, c is relatively low when qa is high. That is, S would like
to pay less if he has more good coins. On the other hand, he must pay more
for his bad coins. Otherwise, P would not take risk to accept mixing bad coins.
No equilibrium exists when qa is lower than 0.5 even if S pays all his coins. So555
the existence of equilibria heavily depends on the parameters.




















Figure 6: The conditions of equilibrium for suicide policy (a = 5, b = 10, d = 25, βa = 1.5,
βb = 2.1, qb = p = 0.5).
We fix qb = 0.6 as a reference for the case qb = 0.5, where other parameters
26
are the same (as shown in Figure 7). The equilibria for qb = 0.6 include the
points in area IV , while those for qb = 0.5 include the points in areas I, II,
III and IV . It’s obvious the equilibria area is larger when qb is smaller, which560
means P prefer to mix when he has more bad coins. Note that here we only
discuss the existence of equilibria instead of precise values and the equilibria
areas vary with variant parameters.






















Figure 7: The conditions of equilibrium for suicide policy (a = 5, b = 10, d = 25, βa = 1.5,
βb = 2.1, qb = p = 0.5).
6. Conclusions and future works
The method of mixing coins is a double-edged sword, which may provide565
privacy and facilitate money launder. Previous works solve this problem when
blacklist is common knowledge or present simultaneous game under imperfect
information. In this paper, we consider complex scenario, where blacklist is not
updated timely. Furthermore, we allow parties to take actions alternatively.
Therefore, previous solutions do not match to this new scenario. We introduce570
deposits enforced by smart contracts and extend the utilities in the new model.
27
Furthermore, we analyze poison and haircut policies under incomplete infor-
mation and list the conditions for sub-game perfect equilibrium. That is, S
sponsors a smart contract for mixing coins and P accepts it. However, deposits
mechanism fails to directly transplant for seniority policy since parties cannot575
negotiate beforehand. In the sequel, we proposed suicide policy to prevent bad
coins from entering mixing.
In this paper, we fixed our model under some assumptions. For example, we
assume that the blacklist will be updated after the game. These assumptions
should be unbundled and more general models are needed in the future works.580
Furthermore, the parameters in our model are not necessary optimal ones since
we choose them manually. In the future works, we may break this defect by
introducing machine learning. One of the urgent problems is to build a data set
for the target.
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